S04E06 - The Organisation Conundrum - When Bigger Means Slower

# S04E06 - The Organisation Conundrum: When Bigger Means Slower

**Duration:** ~30-35 minutes  

**Host:** Daniel Helmig with AI co-host AImee

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Daniel: [00:00:00] Welcome to the Supply Chain Dialogues, Season Four, Episode Six. I’m Daniel Helmig, and if you’ve been following this season, you’ll know we’ve been systematically dismantling the conventional wisdom about climate action in the largest Greenhouse Gas emitting area - the supply chains.

We’ve covered the Standards Paradox, where more measurement means less action. We’ve explored the Economics of Inaction, where traditional financial analysis kills climate investments. We’ve examined the Policy Irrelevance Crisis, where regulations miss the mark entirely. And we’ve tackled the Tech Trap, where digital solutions do not substitute for operational transformation.

Today, we’re addressing one of the most puzzling aspects of the research for me: the Organisation Conundrum. Our research reveals that larger companies with more resources, bigger sustainability departments, and greater market influence actually struggle *more* with Scope 3 emissions reduction than their smaller counterparts.

Aimee: Daniel, as your AI co-host who exists without organisational structure, I find this fascinating. Surely larger organisations should have an advantage? More money, more people, more expertise?

Daniel: [00:01:15] That’s what everyone assumes, AImee. And, that’s what I assumed when I started this research. It’s undoubtedly what the literature suggests. But the data tells an entirely different story.

The statistical findings are stark: we found a significant negative interaction between company size and implementation effectiveness. The standardised regression coefficient was minus 0.1847, significant at p equals 0.0052. In plain language, as companies grow, they become *worse* at translating sustainability commitments into operational changes.

Aimee: That’s counterintuitive. What’s going wrong?

Daniel: [00:02:00] Before we dive into what’s wrong, let me share what makes this finding particularly significant. This challenges decades of research that assumed larger firms are better positioned to implement environmental initiatives. Previous studies by researchers found that firm size positively correlates with ESG disclosure levels. I can share the sources, if anyone is interested. Just write me a note.

But here’s the critical distinction: disclosing is not the same as doing. Larger companies are brilliant at reporting. They have comprehensive sustainability reports, detailed carbon accounting, and sophisticated ESG frameworks. But when it comes to actually changing supply chains to reduce emissions, especially Scope 3 supply chain emissions? That’s where the wheels come off.

Aimee: So we’re back to the difference between transparency and transformation?

Daniel: Precisely. And the organisational structures in larger companies are often fundamentally incompatible with the kind of rapid, cross-functional transformation required for Scope 3 reduction.

Let me give you a concrete example. I’ll call them AutoCorp, a major automotive supplier with about 15,000 employees globally. They have a dedicated sustainability department with 12 full-time staff. They publish annual sustainability reports that win awards. Their carbon accounting is impeccable.

Aimee: Sounds impressive so far.

Daniel: [00:03:30] Here’s what happened when they tried to reduce emissions from their tier-one suppliers. The sustainability team identified that switching to renewable energy-powered suppliers for three key components could reduce Scope 3 emissions by 18%.

Fantastic finding. Now, to implement this, they needed approval from: the procurement department (who were measured on cost savings), the quality team (who had long-standing relationships with current suppliers), the operations team (who were worried about supply reliability), the finance department (who wanted traditional ROI calculations), and three different regional management teams (who each had different priorities and bonus structures).

Aimee: That’s kind of… complicated.

Daniel: [00:04:15] It took 18 months of meetings, negotiations, and approvals. By the time they got sign-off, two of the proposed renewable energy suppliers had been acquired by competitors, and the third had filled its capacity. The initiative died. Zero emissions reduction despite 18 months of effort from a team of sustainability professionals.

Compare that to a mid-sized company,  let’s call them MechTech,  with 800 employees. Their sustainability “department” was one person who spent 60% of their time on sustainability and 40% on other tasks. This person had direct access to the CEO, who personally knew all the key suppliers.

Aimee: Let me guess: they moved faster?

Daniel: [00:05:00] They implemented a similar supplier transition in four months. The sustainability person spoke with the CEO, the CEO personally called the three key suppliers, they negotiated new arrangements, and it was done. Emissions reduced by 15% in that category.

Now, I’m not saying small is always better. And I am not a big fan of getting CEO’s involved in everything, since they should have good people working for them. But this illustrates why our research found what we found. Organisational complexity creates friction. And in large organisations, that friction through the division of labour on a large scale, is often overwhelming.

Aimee: So what are the specific structural barriers that larger companies face?

Daniel: [00:05:35] The research and my corporate as well as consulting experience show several systematic barriers. Let’s walk through them.

First, **siloed decision-making**. In larger organisations, different functions optimise for different objectives. Procurement optimises for cost and flow. Operations optimise for reliability. Finance optimises for ROI. Sustainability optimises for emissions reduction reporting. These objectives often conflict, and there’s no precise mechanism for resolution.

In smaller organisations, the same person often wears multiple hats, or at minimum, the decision-makers all sit in the same building and can sort things out over lunch.

Aimee: That makes sense. What else?

Daniel: [00:06:15] Second, **diffused accountability**. In a large organisation, who is actually responsible for Scope 3 emissions? The sustainability team identifies the problem but doesn’t control procurement decisions. The procurement team makes supplier selections but isn’t measured on emissions. The operations team manages supplier relationships but has no mandate to reduce emissions.

Everyone is involved, but nobody owns it. It’s what I call “responsibility without authority meets authority without responsibility.”

Aimee: That sounds like a recipe for paralysis.

Daniel: [00:06:50] Third, **risk aversion at scale**. Larger organisations have more to lose. Changing suppliers isn’t just a decision; it’s a risk that needs to be quantified, assessed, approved at multiple levels, and insured against. The bigger the organisation, the more elaborate the risk assessment process.

I’ve seen companies spend more on risk assessment studies than the actual cost difference between the current supplier and a lower-carbon alternative. The irony is they’re so busy managing downside risk that they miss the transformation opportunity entirely.

Aimee: And smaller companies can just move?

Daniel: [00:07:25] They’re not reckless, but they can make decisions faster. Their risk tolerance is different. A mid-sized company might say, “We know this new supplier. They’re proposing renewable energy. Let’s trial it on one product line.” A large company says, “We need a comprehensive risk assessment, supplier audits, legal review, and board approval before we can trial anything.”

By the time the large company finishes their assessment, the mid-sized company has already transitioned and is seeing results. And mid-sized companies are a considerable force. Here In Switzerland, where they are called KMUs, they represent a wooping 99% of all companies, and account for about 70% of the workforce.

Aimee: What about the fourth barrier?

Daniel: [00:08:00] **Incentive misalignment**. This is perhaps the most insidious. In large organisations, people are measured on functional metrics. The procurement director is measured on cost savings and supply reliability. The operations director is measured on production efficiency and quality. The regional manager is measured on regional profit.

Nobody’s bonus depends on emissions reduction, let alon Scope 3 mission reduction, at least not in any meaningful way. Oh, it might be 3% of their variable compensation, but 70% is tied to traditional financial and operational metrics.

So when there’s a conflict, and there’s always one: people optimise for what they’re actually measured on. Even more so often, the CEO or board, forced by the media or some activist shareholders, declare an emission or sustainability target. They delegate that then to their sustainability, or even worst, their finance team - without defining a mechanism for resolving the normal clash of objectives.

Aimee: [00:08:40] But surely, larger companies could just change their incentive structures?

Daniel: You’d think so. And some are trying. But here’s the problem: changing incentive structures in a large organisation requires renegotiating with works councils, potentially restructuring compensation across multiple countries with different labour laws, and getting buy-in from hundreds of managers who quite like their current metrics, thank you very much.

One automotive company I worked with spent two years trying to incorporate meaningful carbon metrics into their management incentive structure. They succeeded in creating a system so complex that nobody understood how it worked, which rather defeated the purpose.

Aimee: So larger organisations are trapped by their own complexity?

Daniel: [00:09:25] That’s a good way to put it. Let me share another dimension of this: **geographic complexity**. Now, this is where the research reveals something fascinating and counterintuitive.

Aimee: More counterintuitive findings? I’m almost afraid to ask.

Daniel: [00:09:40] Remember how I said larger companies face more barriers? Well, companies with broader geographic revenue distribution—meaning they operate globally rather than just locally or regionally—actually perform *better* at Scope 3 emissions reduction.

The standardised regression coefficient was minus 0.283. Companies with broader geographic presence demonstrated better control over their Scope 3 emissions.

Aimee: Wait, that seems to contradict everything you just said about complexity being bad.

Daniel: [00:10:15] I know. It’s one of those findings that made me question my own research. But when you dig into it, it makes sense. Geographic diversity creates a different kind of complexity than organisational size alone.

Companies operating globally are exposed to diverse regulatory environments. They deal with the EU’s stringent requirements, California’s climate regulations, China’s environmental standards, and everything in between. This forces them to develop robust sustainability management systems that work across contexts.

Aimee: So regulatory diversity drives capability?

Daniel: [00:10:50] Exactly. Plus, global companies have access to a broader ecosystem of suppliers and partners. If they can’t find a low-carbon solution in Germany, they might find it in Sweden or South Korea. They’re not limited to local supply networks.

And there’s another factor: global companies tend to have more sophisticated internal knowledge-sharing networks. A breakthrough in carbon reduction in their Chinese facility can be rapidly deployed in their German operations.

Aimee: So geographic complexity is good, but organisational complexity is bad?

Daniel: [00:11:25] It’s more nuanced than that. Geographic complexity brings challenges ,  coordination across time zones, cultural differences, varying technical capabilities. But it also brings opportunities that can outweigh those challenges.

Organisational complexity, on the other hand ,  the silos, the bureaucracy, the diffused accountability ,  that seems to be pure friction with no upside.

Let me share a specific case that illustrates the difference. ElectroCorp operates in 12 countries with about 8,000 employees. Their German team discovered a brilliant supplier in Taiwan that produced components using 60% less energy than their European suppliers.

Aimee: Let me guess —did their global presence helped them access this supplier?

Daniel: [00:12:10] Better than that. Their Taiwanese facility had been working with this supplier for three years. The knowledge existed within the company, it just hadn’t crossed organisational boundaries. Once they created a cross-regional sustainability knowledge network—essentially monthly video calls where different regions shared their innovations—the insights flowed rapidly.

Within 12 months, they’d identified and implemented supplier transitions in four different regions, reducing overall Scope 3 emissions by 22%. Their geographic diversity became a strategic advantage.

Aimee: So, how do larger companies overcome these structural barriers?

Daniel: [00:12:50] That’s the million-euro question, isn’t it? Based on the research and my consulting work, I can suggest several approaches, though I’ll be honest: none of them are easy.

First, **create dedicated transformation teams** with genuine authority. Not sustainability advisory teams that make recommendations nobody follows. I mean teams with budget authority, decision-making power, and direct reporting lines to the CEO or board.

One chemical company created what they called a “Climate Transformation Office” with five people reporting directly to the CEO. They had the authority to override procurement decisions if necessary, subject to CEO approval. Was it disruptive? Absolutely. Did it work? Their Scope 3 emissions dropped 15% in two years.

Aimee: That sounds like a radical restructuring.

Daniel: [00:13:40] It is. And that’s the point. Incremental organisational adjustments won’t overcome systematic structural barriers. You need structural interventions.

Second approach: **decentralised decision-making** with centralised coordination. Instead of requiring all sustainability decisions to flow through headquarters, empower regional or business unit teams to make decisions up to a certain threshold.

For example, any supplier change expected to reduce emissions by more than 5% automatically gets approved at the regional level, no corporate sign-off needed. Decisions can happen in weeks instead of months.

Aimee: But how do you maintain consistency?

Daniel: [00:14:20] Through what I call “distributed governance.” You establish clear principles and boundaries at the corporate level,  like “we prioritise renewable energy suppliers” or “carbon reduction takes precedence over cost savings up to 10% premium.” Then you trust regional teams to operate within those boundaries.

One electronics manufacturer implemented this approach. The corporation set the target: 30% Scope 3 reduction by 2030. Each business unit got autonomy over how to achieve it. Different units took entirely different approaches—supplier transition, logistics optimisation, product redesign—but all moved faster because they weren’t waiting for corporate approval at every step.

Aimee: What was the result?

Daniel: [00:15:05] They hit their 2030 target in 2027. Three years early. And when they analysed what worked, they found that the most effective approaches came from business units, not from corporate strategy. The diversity of approaches led to faster learning and better solutions.

Third approach: **modified incentive systems**. This is brutally difficult in large organisations, but it’s essential. If you’re serious about Scope 3 reduction, make it a primary metric rather than a secondary consideration.

Aimee: How do you do that without oversimplifying?

Daniel: [00:15:40] You need to be sophisticated about it. For procurement managers, create a “carbon-adjusted total cost of ownership” metric that includes an internal carbon price. For operations managers, measure supply chain emissions per unit of output alongside traditional efficiency metrics. For regional managers, include Scope 3 reduction as 30-40% of their variable compensation, not 5%.

One automotive supplier did this. They established an internal carbon price of €100 per tonne, applied it consistently across all business cases, and adjusted bonus calculations accordingly. Suddenly, low-carbon options became more attractive because they were evaluated on the proper criteria.

Aimee: Did people accept that?

Daniel: [00:16:25] Not initially. There was significant resistance. But the CEO was committed; he had the backing of the supervisory board that had thankfully a few longterm thinkers in their midst. They rolled it out over two years with extensive communication, and eventually it became normal. Now their managers actively seek out low-carbon alternatives because that’s what they’re measured on.

Fourth approach: **cross-functional governance structures**. Stop organising sustainability as a separate function that tries to influence everyone else. Create cross-functional teams with members from procurement, operations, finance, and sustainability that jointly own emissions reduction targets.

Aimee: How is that different from the usual cross-functional committees that accomplish nothing?

Daniel: [00:17:05] Authority. These teams don’t make recommendations; they make decisions. They have budget authority, they can approve supplier changes, they can reallocate resources. They’re not advisory; they’re operational.

One mechanical engineering company created what they called “CCTs: Carbon Control Teams” at the business unit level. Five people: procurement lead, operations lead, finance representative, sustainability expert, and an engineer. They met weekly, had authority to make decisions up to €500,000, and were collectively measured on emissions reduction.

Aimee: That must have been culturally challenging.

Daniel: [00:17:45] Oh, it was chaos initially. The procurement person and the sustainability person would argue about every decision. But within six weeks, they’d learned to find solutions that met multiple objectives. Within a year, they were moving faster than they ever had under the old structure.

And here’s the unexpected benefit: the cross-functional perspective led to innovations nobody had considered. The engineer suggested design changes that reduced material usage. The operations person identified logistics optimisations. The finance person found creative funding mechanisms. When you put diverse perspectives in the same room with joint accountability, creativity emerges - very similar to small to medium-sized company set-ups.

Aimee: [00:18:25] What about the counterargument that all this restructuring is itself disruptive and costly?

Daniel: Fair question. Yes, organisational restructuring is disruptive. Yes, it costs money. Yes, people resist change. But here’s the alternative: continuing with structures that systematically prevent the very outcomes you claim to want.

But let me tell you another story out of my own recent corporate life: We talked about it as well here in the podcast: I was in charge of the largest organizational restructuring of a company with, at that point 160000 people, in over 110 countries. The CEO and the supervisory board president asked me to move a centralistic organization with a three dimensional org structure (Functional, Divisions, and Regions) into a fully decentralized set-up. 

The Challenge: Prioritising speed, customer focus, and accountability – whilst simultaneously empowering those on the ground to become decision-makers.

The approach was grounded in academic research from Harvard Business School and the University of St. Gallen. The methodology was systematic:

• Comprehensive analyses with business unit leaders: Which corporate functions create genuine value? Which merely tie up resources?

• A 90% reduction of corporate headquarters (approximately 13,000 positions) within 24 months

• Clear accountabilities: decisions made where the responsibility lies – not three floors up

• Transfer of all fiduciary responsibilities across 120 countries to the business units

• All projected cost savings realised – whilst simultaneously improving operational effectiveness

THE RESULT: BACK ON TRACK

ABB's share price stagnated at around 19 Swiss francs during a decade-long centralisation. After decentralisation: 58 francs. A tripling of market capitalisation. This transformation prioritised real competence and execution speed over theoretical economies of scale.

And several hundred million in annual savings as well. So - unleashing the power of smaller entities, if managed right, with good accounting systems and a leadership that does not take it self too important, can make a big difference, not only when it comes to emission reductions.

Aimee: [00:19:15] Wow, I recall we talked about it once. So, you moved from Saulus to Paulus on this one. I remember you’re being a big centralist before. 

Daniel: [00:19:20] The Brits say: Horses for courses. I just to not subscribe to one methodology (or hammer) out of the tool box. With the proper, unemotional assessment, taking into consideration as well the culture of a company, the decision might be stronger centralisation, decentralisation of hybrid - but it has to be based on evidence based management, not on the opinion of a few people in the upper floors of the building.

AImee: Ok, then let’s talk about the role of leadership. How vital is top-level commitment?

Daniel: [00:19:20] Critically necessary, but not sufficient. I’ve seen plenty of CEOs make passionate speeches about climate action whilst their organisational structures ensure nothing happens. Commitment without structural change is just theatre.

However, effective leadership can drive structural change, as I as well could show with my own experience. The CEOs who succeed are those who recognise that changing outcomes requires changing systems, not just changing minds. And sometimes, when the CEOs do not want to change, to not question their earlier stance, it is time for a supervisory board, to say: Thank you and good-bye. Let’s not forget: the average tenure of CEOs in western countries is under 4 years.

But let me share a different example: The CEO of an aerospace components manufacturer, I’ll call them AeroDyne, announced a climate commitment: net-zero Scope 3 by 2035. Nice speech, everyone applauded. Six months later, nothing had changed.

So he did something radical. He dissolved the sustainability department.

Aimee: He did what?? That seems… counterproductive!

Daniel: [00:20:10] Everyone thought so. But here’s what he did: he reassigned those sustainability professionals into operational roles—one into procurement, one into operations, one into product development, and one into logistics. Their job was to integrate sustainability into those functions, not to advise from the outside.

Then he changed the management scorecard. Scope 3 emissions became a primary KPI alongside revenue and profitability. Monthly management meetings started with an emissions review, not a financial review.

Finally, he gave each business unit autonomy to achieve targets however they chose, with one rule: the group target must be met.

Aimee: What happened?

Daniel: [00:20:55] Within two years, they’d reduced Scope 3 emissions by 28%. Not through any grand central strategy, but through hundreds of small changes driven by people who now had both the capability and the motivation to act.

The former sustainability people brought expertise directly into decision-making. The business units competed to find the best solutions. The management focus signalled what mattered. The structure enabled action.

That’s leadership. Structural change by bold actions. Not speeches. 

Aimee: [00:21:25] You mentioned earlier that industry type wasn’t a significant factor in your research. That surprises me. Surely automotive faces different challenges than electronics or mechanical engineering?

Daniel: [00:21:35] That was surprising as well. The standardised regression coefficient was not statistically significant.

This challenges the prevailing assumption in current literature that sector-specific characteristics fundamentally determine a company’s ability to reduce emissions. Many Researchers I found in the dissertation's extensive literature review have emphasised industry-specific barriers, but our data doesn’t support that.

Aimee: So what matters instead of industry?

Daniel: [00:22:10] Organisational structure matters. Decision-making processes matter. Incentive systems matter. Geographic distribution matters. Size matters,  though in the wrong direction. But whether you’re making cars or making computers? That doesn’t seem to matter nearly as much as we thought.

I think this is actually quite liberating. It means there’s no excuse of “our industry is different” or “these solutions won’t work in our sector.” The barriers are organisational, not technical. Which means they’re solvable through organisational change.

Aimee: That makes sense. Let’s talk about some practical steps. If a large company recognises these barriers, what should they do first?

Daniel: [00:22:50] Start with an honest organisational audit. Map your decision-making processes for supply chain changes. Identify who needs to approve what. Document how long decisions actually take. Track where initiatives die.

Most companies have no idea how complex their own decision-making has become. They’d be horrified if they actually mapped it. One company I worked with discovered that a simple supplier change required 17 separate approvals across eight different departments. Seventeen! No wonder nothing happened.

Once you’ve mapped the current state, identify the three biggest bottlenecks. Here, process mining with software that maps and analyses the corporate processes helps. Check every journaling entry in the ERP and other systems, and map them against the official or to-be process line-ups. It’s not costly, but highly revealing. I’ve done it, for example, with the German company Celonis, and in another company, we used UIPath. 

Aimee: Can you give an example?

Daniel: [00:23:35] One company found that every sustainable procurement initiative died in the financial approval process because finance required three-year payback periods for any capital expenditure. Sustainable options often had four- or five-year paybacks.

Solution? After a quick process mapping of their systems, they created a separate approval track for sustainability investments, with different financial criteria. Not unlimited money, but recognition that environmental investments have different profiles than equipment purchases. That one change unblocked dozens of initiatives.

Aimee: What should smaller companies do? Do they need to worry about these organisational barriers?

Daniel: [00:24:15] Smaller companies should worry about becoming larger companies. As you grow, be intentional about avoiding structures that will later constrain you.

One mid-sized company I work with is growing rapidly, at 15% per year. They’re being very thoughtful about organisational design. They’re keeping teams small and cross-functional. They’re maintaining direct lines of communication. They’re resisting the urge to create elaborate approval processes. When they grow to a certain level, they set up a new business unit and let it grow. I call this “corporate mitosis”, cell division.

The CEO told me, “We’ve seen what happens to large companies. We don’t want to become this way accidentally. We want to stay nimble even as we scale.”

That’s wisdom, that’s leadership. Because the bureaucracy doesn’t appear overnight, it accumulates gradually through seemingly sensible decisions. By the time you realise it’s a problem, you’re stuck with it.

Aimee: [00:25:05] As we wrap up this time, what’s the key takeaway on the organisation conundrum?

Daniel: The key insight is that organisational structure isn’t neutral. Your structure either enables transformation or prevents it. In most large organisations, the structure was designed for different priorities: efficiency, economies of scale, risk management, and functional specialisation. Those structures are fundamentally incompatible with the cross-functional, rapid-iteration, risk-tolerant approach needed for emissions reduction.

You can hire as many sustainability experts as you want. You can buy all the available carbon accounting software. You can sign every climate pledge invented. But if your organisational structure, including your incentive system, systematically prevents implementation, you won’t make progress.

The research proves this. Larger organisations with more resources demonstrate worse outcomes. That’s not because large companies are less committed. It’s because large companies have structures that are harder to transform.

Aimee: And the solution?

Daniel: [00:26:15] Structural change. Distributed authority. Modified incentives. Cross-functional governance. There’s no single solution, but all successful approaches share one characteristic: they recognise that changing outcomes requires changing systems.

And here’s the hopeful part: organisational structure is changeable. It’s not physics. The laws of thermodynamics do not constrain it. It’s human design, which means it can be redesigned, in the confines of the company's history and culture.

The companies that will succeed in reducing GHG emissions aren’t necessarily those with the most resources. They’re the companies willing to restructure around climate priorities rather than trying to bolt climate actions onto existing structures.

Aimee: What can listeners expect in Episode 7?

Daniel: [00:26:55] In our next episode, we’ll synthesise everything we’ve learned across the first six episodes and translate the research into actionable recommendations. In the next episodes we’ll cover what academics should study, what policymakers should change, and most importantly, what business leaders should do differently.

Because understanding why current approaches fail is only valuable if we can identify what actually works. And that’s precisely what we’ll tackle in the next episodes, starting with seven.

Aimee: Before we close, you mentioned that larger companies with geographic diversity perform better. Can you share one more example of that dynamic?

Daniel: [00:27:30] Sure. MachineWorks, a mechanical engineering company with operations in Germany, the Czech Republic, China, and Mexico,  used its geographic diversity brilliantly.

They held quarterly “Carbon Innovation Summits” in which each region presented its best emissions-reduction initiative from the previous quarter. The innovations were remarkably diverse: Mexico found low-carbon logistics providers that Germany didn’t know existed. Czech Republic developed supplier engagement techniques that worked brilliantly in China. Germany contributed advanced measurement capabilities.

But here’s the clever part: after each summit, regions had 90 days to implement at least two innovations from other regions. This created a forcing mechanism for knowledge transfer and rapid deployment.

In three years, they reduced Scope 3 emissions by 34%, with the CEO attributing most of the success to cross-regional learning. Their geographic complexity became their competitive advantage.

Aimee: That’s a brilliant model.

Daniel: [00:28:30] It is. And it’s only possible because they recognised that their global footprint wasn’t a liability to manage, but an asset to leverage. Too many companies view international operations as a complexity problem. The smart ones view it as a capability multiplier.

Aimee: Any final thoughts before we close?

Daniel: [00:28:50] Just this: if you’re in a large organisation and feel frustrated that sustainability initiatives keep getting bogged down, it’s not your imagination. The research validates what you’re experiencing. The structure is working against you.

But that also means you’re not alone, and there are proven approaches to overcome these barriers. Don’t accept structural constraints as immutable. Challenge them. Redesign them because the weather driven by climate change doesn’t care about organisational charts.

As always, you can reach us at dialogues@helmigadvisory.com with your experiences, questions, or organisational success or horror stories. We read every email, and your insights help shape future episodes.

Until next time, remember: changing the world requires changing systems, not just changing minds.

Stay safe, be bold, and see you in two weeks.

These are the Supply Chain Dialogues, produced and copyrighted by Helmig Advisory in 2025.

[00:29:45] [End of Episode]